2010 MIT Sloan Sports Analytics Conference

I look forward to being a speaker at the 2010 MIT Sloan Sloan Sports Analytics Conference, which will be held this Saturday, March 6. It will be an all day event. Other speakers include:

* Daryl Morey, Houston Rockets GM (and MIT grad)

* Mark Cuban, Owner of the Dallas Mavericks

* Steve Pagliuca, Managing Partner of the Boston Celtics

* Sunil Gulati, President, United States Soccer Federation & Kraft Soccer

* Michael Lewis, author of Money Ball

* Jonathan Kraft, President of the Kraft Group and executive at the New England Patriots

I'll be on the panel titled, "Performance Enhancement: Will Future Athletes be Formula One or NASCAR?". Here are some details on it:

Athletes have progressively gotten bigger, faster, and stronger since the beginning of professional sports. This panel will delve into the science and technology that is producing better athletes. Is there a limit to athletic performance? What constitutes a "level" playing field and when is the line crossed? How are sports changing to deal with today's athletes?

Panelists

Michael McCann, Legal Analyst, Sports Illustrated

Mark Verstegen, Founder and Chairman, Athletes' Performance

Dr. Kim Blair, Founding Director, MIT Center for Sports Innovation; Director of the Sports Engineering Practice at Cooper Perkins, Inc.

Dr. Thomas Murray, President & CEO, The Hastings Center

Moderator

Gary Belsky, Editor in Chief, ESPN The Magazine

For more information click here.

The Star Caps Saga Continues

More than a year after the NFL attempted to suspend Pat and Kevin Williams of the Minnesota Vikings for violating the NFL Policy on Anabolic Steroids and Related Substances (the “NFL Policy”), litigation involving the case continues. The case took another turn last week when Judge Gary Larson, a Minnesota state court judge, handed down a 44 page opinion in response to the parties’ motions for summary judgment.

Here are some questions raised by the fairly dense opinion, with some answers.

1. What was the ruling? Judge Larson spent most of the opinion rejecting the arguments of the NFL and the Williamses. He rejected the NFL’s arguments that the league’s drug policy should trump state law, and rejected most of the Williamses’ arguments that the suspensions violated Minnesota state law.

2. Did the NFL Win? Yes and no. I’ll start here with what they lost. The NFL was looking for a sweeping victory in this case. The league wants a court—or Congress—to make a determination that the NFL’s drug policies trump state law, so that players cannot resort to state laws to challenge drug suspensions. The NFL did not get that sweeping pronouncement from the federal courts, Congress, or Judge Larson.

Instead, Judge Larson held that the Minnesota Drug and Alcohol Testing in the Workplace Act (DATWA) and the Minnesota Consumable Products Act (CPA) apply to professional sports leagues. Why? Well, most simply, because the statutes do not provide any explicit exception for the sports leagues. Although the legislative history of the statutes make it fairly clear that those laws were not created to govern the performance-enhancing drug testing of professional sports, Judge Larson was not willing to ignore the plain meaning of the statute to read in an exception for the NFL. In other words, if the NFL wants an exclusion from DATWA and CPA, it will have to obtain one from the Minnesota state legislature, not from Judge Larson.

Also, using the same rationale as the federal courts, Judge Larson rejected the NFL’s argument that the NFL’s collective bargaining agreement preempts DATWA and CPA.

3. Lost and 24 are having disappointing seasons. What can they do to improve? One word: crossover. Who wouldn’t want to watch Jack Bauer shouting and torturing his way across the island? “The following takes place between, well, I have no idea when this is taking place.”

4. Did the NFL Violate Minnesota State Law? Judge Larson rejected most of the Williamses’ arguments under DATWA (and all of the CPA claims), but held that the NFL violated DATWA by failing to inform the Williamses of their positive test results within three days of the test. Judge Larson also held that the NFL may have violated DATWA’s confidentiality provision. The press allegedly found out about the positive test results before the players, but it’s unclear if the results of the tests were disclosed by the NFL. That issue will have to be determined at trial.

5. If State Laws Apply to the NFL’s Drug Testing Policies, How Can the NFL Maintain a Uniform Policy?
Since the beginning of this dispute, the NFL has argued that application of state laws to the NFL’s drug policies will destroy the ability of the NFL to maintain an effective, uniform drug policy. Judge Larson, however, was unconvinced by the NFL’s argument for two primary reasons. First, Judge Larson was not persuaded that the NFL had a special need to maintain a uniform policy. He wrote: “Despite varying state laws, corporations that participate in employee drug testing conduct business across state lines everyday in this country. Defendants fail to demonstrate why it would be more onerous for the NFL to comply with state laws, than for any other business engaged in interstate commerce.”

Second, even if the NFL did have a special need for uniformity, Judge Larson held that this need is outweighed by Minnesota’s interest in protecting the health and safety of its employees.

Why the lack of deference given to the NFL? In part, it could simply be that Judge Larson does not believe that the NFL should be treated any differently than other interstate businesses and should not be able to bargain around state law. But, Judge Larson also made it clear that he did not see why application of DATWA would prevent the NFL from enforcing its drug policy. According to Judge Larson, DATWA only provides a floor, or minimum protections, for drug testing, and the NFL is free to provide more protection. Judge Larson did not see how notifying the players of their positive tests within three days and not (potentially) leaking the results of the test to the media (which would also violate the confidentiality provision of the NFL’s own policy) would hurt the ability of the NFL to enforce its policy. The NFL, of course, is making a broader argument—they are concerned that a state would enact a law that is too lenient and would prevent the league from disciplining its players in a uniform manner. According to Judge Larson, however, DATWA does not present those concerns, so he did not need to respond to the NFL’s broader argument.

6. Can the NFL Still Win this Case? Yes. It’s not all bad news for the league. DATWA only governs “employers” of Minnesota employees, so the NFL can win the case if it can prove at trial that the Vikings, and not the league, are the employer of the Williamses. A ruling that the NFL is not the employer of the players would be a sweeping victory—it would immunize the league from Minnesota state employment law (and potentially from other similar state statutes). But, here’s where it gets interesting. As Judge Larson explained, the Willamses can argue that the NFL is their employer under the “single employer doctrine,” which “looks at whether the commonality of the employers’ operations, management, labor relations, and ownership or financial control, is sufficient to indicate that they should be treated as one whole.” In other words, if the court determines that the league and its teams should be treated as “one whole,” then the NFL is the employer of the Williamses and in violation of DATWA. So, for purposes of this case, it is in the best interests of the NFL to argue that the league and the teams should not be treated as a single entity.

Yet, earlier this year, the NFL argued before the Supreme Court in American Needle that NFL teams have no value without the league and thus the league and its teams should be considered one entity. Granted, the single employer doctrine in the Star Caps case and the single entity antitrust doctrine in the American Needle case are different legal theories that serve very different functions. So, it would not be entirely inconsistent for the NFL to argue that each of the individual teams employs their individual players for purposes of employment law, and that each of these teams and the league act as one entity for purposes of antitrust law. But, there is some overlap in the two doctrines, and the NFL might be walking a fine line here. At a minimum, the NFL’s position in the Star Caps case (that there is a distinction between the teams and the league for employment purposes) lends additional weight to the conclusion of nearly every court that sports leagues and their teams constitute multiple entities for antitrust purposes when acting in the labor market. Of course, this conclusion is not inconsistent with the Seventh Circuit’s decision in American Needle, where the Seventh Circuit recognized that the NFL might be a single entity in some markets (e.g., licensing of intellectual property) and multiple entities in others (e.g., signing players).

7. What’s next?
A settlement conference is scheduled for March 1st, and the trial is set for March 8th. If the NFL loses the case and subsequent appeals, look for them to ask the Minnesota state legislature to exclude professional sports leagues (or at least those with collectively bargained drug policies) from DATWA. If that fails, we might see the NFL go back to Congress asking for help…

New SI.com Column on NFL Teams Cutting Players with Post Concussion Symptoms

In the wake of the Eagles cutting Brian Westbrook, I have a new SI.com column on the legal, ethical, and political implications of NFL teams cutting players who suffer from concussions. Here's an excerpt:

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The NFL's collective bargaining agreement does not distinguish concussions from other injuries for purposes of cutting a player. But should it?

After all, there is an arguable disconnect between the NFL's stated commitment to addressing the concussion problem and the ability of teams to cut players who were injured by concussions. In his testimony before the House Judiciary Committee last October, commissioner Roger Goodell said of the link between head injuries and brain ailments, "I can think of no issue to which I've devoted more time and attention than the health and well-being of our players, and particularly retired players."

If that is true, shouldn't players who suffer concussions receive heightened employment protections? In fact, if a player can be cut because of postconcussion symptoms, he may have an incentive to not reveal his injury, a decision that could undermine his health, particularly his long term neurological health.

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NFL teams, for their part, could argue that their decision to cut players who suffer from postconcussion symptoms is neither heartless nor at odds with league efforts to curb concussions; rather, it is a necessity of a salary cap that ties teams' hands. Teams might also insist that it's not their fault if a player suffers concussions -- it's the sport's fault or an unfortunate materialization of risk that every NFL player assumes every down he plays.

Still, the NFL may want to think carefully about teams cutting players with postconcussion symptoms. Congress would seem poised to revisit the concussion topic if there were a pattern of players cut after suffering concussions. Congress has leverage over the NFL, including the threat that it can repeal the Sports Broadcasting Act, which provides antitrust immunity to the NFL and other leagues for their national TV deals. Congress might also re-evaluate the NFL's status as a 501(c)(6) nonprofit organization, which furnishes the league with favorable tax treatment.

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Hope you have a chance to read the rest of the column. I'll be on ESPN Radio's John Clayton Show at 6 p.m. Saturday to discuss the column.

An Update on MLB Properties v. Upper Deck

As discussed here earlier in the month, MLB Properties - MLB's trademark licensing and enforcement entity - recently filed a trademark infringement lawsuit against trading card manufacturer Upper Deck, alleging that Upper Deck was producing unauthorized sets of baseball cards featuring MLB uniforms and logos. On February 16th, Judge Sweet granted a motion by MLB Properties seeking to condense the hearing for a preliminary injunction along with an expedited trial on the merits, with a trial date now set for April 19th.


The Beckett Blog is closely following the litigation in a series of posts, including a recent interview with trademark attorney Miguel Danielson about the case. Meanwhile, most of the court papers are publicly available here.

What about curling?

As the Olympics wind down, I found myself thinking about the "What's a Sport?" question as applied to one of the darlings of these Games--curling. Curling seems to have been discovered in Vancouver, as the public has learned of the game's rhythms (somewhat comparable to baseball), its shot-making and strategy (comparable to golf, with collision physics thrown in), and the attractiveness of many of the female curlers (several European curlers even posed nude for a fund-raising calendar). And curling was a staple of NBC's afternoon live cable coverage during the first week (because the stuff people initially wanted to see was being held for tape-delay), so it was easy to find.

So, is it a sport? Looking at our narrow definition (borrowed from anthropologist John Jackson), no. Jackson requires: 1) a ball or ball-like object as the center of attention; 2) a sense of physical urgency when the ball is in play; and 3) the opponent taking steps to thwart one player's efforts as to the ball.

Curling is OK as to # 1 and # 3--the stone qualifies as a "ball-like object" and the purpose of the game is get your stone closest to the center, often by deliberately knocking the other team's stone away. But it runs into a problem on # 2--sense of physical urgency while the ball is in play. There are no periods of running after the ball--much like golf, which Jackson expressly excludes from his definition. Perhaps we could argue there is physical urgency for the sweepers who must follow the stone and often have to move (and sweep) quickly to get the stone where they want it. The physical movement in curling is arguably greater and more urgent than in golf. In golf, the ball is hit and everyone stands and waits to see where it lands; in curling, the stone is launched and there is some rapid movement to control its progress. So perhaps # 2 is satisfied; it's a close call.

What about the broader definition: 1) Large motor skills; 2) simple machines only; 3) objective scoring; and 4) competition.

Curling passes. The brooms qualify as simple machines and large motor skills in upper and lower body, as well as great balance, are necessary for both the person who launches the stone and the sweepers (putting aside whether sweeping should be part of any sport). Scoring is objective and immediately determined. There you go.

Seton Hall Symposium Postponed

Due to weather, the Seton Hall sports symposium originally scheduled for tomorrow will be postponed. I'll update when a date gets set.

New SI.com Column on Legal Implications of the Olympic Luger's Death

I have an SI.com column on the legal implications on the tragic death of Nodar Kumaritashvili. Here's an excerpt:

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A related issue to the dangerousness of conditions is the type of legal duty owed by the parties to Olympic athletes. According to page 15 of the Olympic Charter, which furnishes the core set of guidelines for the Olympic Games, one of the IOC's roles is "to encourage and support measures protecting the health of athletes." Similarly, according to its own statutes, the International Luge Federation, which regulates luge competitions and works with the IOC, also adheres to the Olympic Charter. Parties involved in the design, construction and maintenance of the Whistler Track would also be expected to provide lugers with reasonable safety.

There are, however, a number of factors that would work against recovery for Kumaritashvili's parents. For one, Kumaritashvili, like other Olympic athletes, had to sign a waiver with the IOC to participate in the Games. The form states: "I acknowledge and agree that: a. I participate in the XXI Olympic Winter Games in Vancouver at my own risk and that I will take all reasonable measures to protect myself from the risks of participation." While waivers are powerful pieces of evidence and bar many forms of civil actions, they are not necessarily complete defenses. The precise wording of the waiver matters considerably; though the Olympic athlete clearly assents to assuming risk as a general matter, certain types risks may not be assumable. Along those lines, even when waivers expressly bar legal claims, they normally do not bar claims based on egregious or unforeseeable behavior. In addition, the IOC's waiver protections may not extend to a torts claim, such as one sounding in wrongful death or negligence, brought against VANOC or other parties.

Even without a waiver, assumption of risk would also be relevant. The fast conditions of the Whistler track were known to Kumaritashvili (and to other lugers) prior to his fatal run. Kumaritashvili, in fact, reportedly told his father that he was concerned about the track's safety. If Kumaritashvili appreciated the actual risk, his choice to nonetheless participate would suggest that he voluntary accepted the risk. Of course, one might wonder how much "choice" he really had: Declining to participate on safety grounds would likely have come with a reputational cost and embarrassment.

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Hope you have a chance to check out the rest of the column. Also, Geoff Rapp and Ryan Rodenberg made some good comments to the Wall Street Journal on this topic.